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Abstract
Monetary policy has two levers with which to manipulate seignorage
revenue collection. Generally speaking, the inflation rate affects the tax
ratewhile reserve requirements affect the size ofthe tax base. In this paper,
I ask how seignorage revenue responds to changes in these two leve~s, both
separately and together. Because both monetary policy. variables affect
the growth rate, the tradeoff is whether the growth-rate 'effects dominate
the policy impact. I begin with an examinationof statisticalregularities
between seignorage revenue and these two monetary policy meaSures, using
cross-country data.
How do changes in monetary policy affect the seignorage revenue collected by
the government? Lowering the inflation rate reduces the tax rate so that for a
given tax base, revenue would fall. Lowering the reserve requirement ratio reduces
the tax base so that for a given inflation rate, revenue would fall. These simple
answers become less clear, however, ifthese policy actions result in faster growth.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact that movements in
both the inflation rate and reserve requirements have on the presentvalue of
seignorage revenue. The experiments considered here are of the following type:
Will an anticipated change in the policy variable(s) permit the government to
fund, in present-value terms, the same stream of expenditures under the new
policy setting as under the initial setting.
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Federal Reserve System.A substantial literature exists which studies the effects of the inflationtax on
economic activity. Most of this literature, however, focuses on the business cycle
behavior related to movements in the inflation rate.! Milton Marquis and Kevin
Reffert (1995) examine the effects that changes in the inflation rate have on the
growth rate in a version of Stockman's model in which cash-in-advance constraint
applies to gross investment purchases. The upshot is that the inflation rate has
implications for the growth rate. Philip Brock (1989) looks at how changes in the
inflation rate and reserve requirement ratio can be used together to obtain the
maximum steady-state level of seignorage revenue. Peter Ireland (1994) studies
a similar question, but in terms of changes in fiscal policy; specifically, Do the
growth-rate increases more than offset a reduction in income tax rates? Thus, the
main contribution of this paper is to investigate the possibility that a dynamic
Laffer curve exists for monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I lookfor statistical regularities
inseignorage revenue andmonetarymeasures. The data are cross-countryand the
methods are similar to those used in looking at the relationship between output
growth and its determinants. I specify a general equilibrium model in Section
2. The- model specifies that seignorage revenue is the only source of government
revenue. What is really important is that at least some capital purchases are
financed via the intermediary. In Section 3, I calibrate the model and investigate
the seignorage revenue impacts for the policy experiments. I modify the basic
model to consider the seignorage revenue impacts for a model in which both
income taxes and unintermediated capital are present. Section 5 offers a brief
summary of the findings.
1. Data Analysis
In this section, I use International Financial Statistics data to examine low free-
quency co-movements between seignorage revenue and monetary policy measures.
These results will be useful for calibrating the modelin the experiments later on.
Moreover, it will be interesting to identify some, if any, empirical regularities that
exist between seignorage revenue and monetary policy variables.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 82 countries included in this sam-
ple. The data are averages of annual values of the ratio of seignorage revenue
to GDP, real, per-capita GDP growth, the inflation rate, and the ratio of bank
'See, for example, Jeremy Greenwood and Gregory Huffman (1987) and Thomas Cooley and
Gary Hansen (1989).
2reserves to deposits2 The data span the period 1975-93,3 Most noteworthy is the
statistics presented in row 1 of Table 1, indicating seignorage revenue relative to
GDP. On average, the 82 countries use seignorage revenue to generate slightly less
than 0.9% of GDP.4 New Zealand generates the smallest percentage of seignorage
revenue relative to GDP while seignorage revenue accounts just over 4% of GDP
in Malaysia.
The relationships between the monetary policy variables and seignorage rev-
enue are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 produces the simple correlation
coefficients between seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio and both inflation and the
reserves-to-deposit ratio. There is a significant positive correlation between the
reserves-to-deposit ratio and seignorage revenue relative to GDP. The coefficient
between inflation and the seignorage revenue measure is small and negative, but
not statistically significant. It is interesting to note that per capita output growth
is positively related to the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio. Table 3 applies a
nonparametric approach. COlmtries are identified as "high" ("low") seignorage
revenue countries by adding (subtracting) 1/2 standard deviation to the mean
ratio of seignorage revenue-to-GDP. Once identified, I then calculate the mean
inflation rate and reserve ratio for the set of high and low countries. As Ta-
ble.3 shows, high reserve requirement countries tend to be associated withhigh
seignorage revenue countries. Similarly, the mean inflatio':' rate is higher for those
countries that rely most heavily on seignorage revenue.
Perhaps the finding that countries. with a relatively high seignorage revenue-
to-GDP ratio tend to have somew4at higher inflation rates than low seignorage-
dependent countries is present because there is a nonlinearity in the inflation
rate-seignorage revenue relationship. I consider a regression to determine ifthere
2The reserve requirement involves one of the more difficult data decisions in· this paper.
In general, reserve requirements are nonlinear functions of deposits in virtually every- country_
Ideally, a researcher would want the average marginal reserve requirement ratio. ,Unfortunately,
the data necessary to construut such a series are,not readily available. My solution was to use
theratio ofbank reserves-to-deposits, thinkingthat this ratio would serve as a rough measure of
the reserve requirement, Here, deposits are defined as checking deposits and savings accounts.
In most countries, these are the deposits against which reserves must be held.
3In the country tables in International Financial Statistics, banks reserves are item 241
deposits are the sum of items 24 and 25, real GDP is item 99, population is item 99z, and
consumer prices are item 64.
. 'Stanley Fischer (1982) also examined the reliance on seignorage revenue by country. Com-
pared with Fisher's data, the range of seignorage tax rates is a bit lower in the sample of
countries. For a more detailed look, a list of the countries and mean values of several variable:;;
are included in the Data Appendix.
3is curvature in the either the inflation-rate effect that are not picked up in the
linear correlation coefficients. For symmetry, I also consider potential curvature
in the relationship between the reserve ratio and the seignorage-CDP ratio. Such
curvature could, for example, indicate either,'a hump- or V-shape 'in the relation-
ship betvreen the ratio of seignorage revenue to CDP and the monetary policy
measures. Because I am using the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-CDP, however,
the curvature implied by the regression does not imply anything about the rela-
tionship between the level of seignorage revenue andthe inflation rate; that is,
the Laffer curve. I run the following regression with a quadratic term to look for
the curvature
Si = 000+ al7[i + 002(7[i)2 +ani +a4(ri? (1.1)
where s denotes the ratio of seignorage revenue to CDP, 7[ is the inflation
rate, and, is the reserve ratio. The results from equation (1) can be used to
identify whether there is one turning point in the relationships between either the
inflation rate- or reserve ratio-seignorage revenue ratio. If 001 is positive and 002 is
negative, then there exists an inflation rate for which"there is a maximum value
for the ratio of seignorage revenue to CDP. Conversely, if 001 is negative and 002 is
positive, there is a minimum value for the seignorage-CDP ratio associated with
a particular inflation rate. The, same holds for the reserve ratio, depending on the
signs of 003 and 004' The maximum or minimum occurs for the inflation rate that




The results of the regression are presented in Table 4. The quadratic fornl
is useful in the sense that there is a nonlinearity present in the relationship be-
tween sand 7[. Indeed, the coefficients on both the inflation rate and its squared
term are both statistically significant. Moreover, the sign on the inflation rate
coefficients indicate that ratio of seignorage revenue-to-CDP is V-shaped in S - 7[
space. Indeed, the minimum s-value occurs at an inflation rate of 317%. For the
range of inflation rates we observe in this sample, the regression results would be
associated with the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-CDP as a decreasing function,
of the inflation rate. For the reserves-to-deposit ratio, the evidence suggests that
a hump-shape is present in s-,space. The s-value maximum occurs at a reserve
ratio approximately equal to 62%.
2. The Model
In this section, the model is presented. Initially, I assume that seignorage revenue
is the only source of funding. This assumption will be relaxed in later sections.
42.1. Model specification.
The economy has four types of decisionmakers: firms, households, banks, and the
government. In each period, firms maximize profits in a perfectly competitive
market, renting capital, K, to produce the single consumption good, Y. Input
markets are also perfectly competitive. Because the firm rents capital from the
bank, the maximization problem reduces to a series of static problems. The
implication is that firms sell output at the price, p, and rent capital up until the
point where the marginal product equals its rental rate, q.
Production is determined by the common-knowledge technology. Let t denote
the period where t = 0, 1, 2, ...The date-t production function is represented by
yt = AK t . (2.1)
Over time, capital depreciates at the fixed rate, 0, and expandsvia investment,
X. I assume that the consumption is costlessly transformed into the capital good
at a one-for-one rate. The law of motion for capital is th,m expressed as
Kt+l = (1 - o)Kt +X t (2.2)
Following John Bryant and Neil Wallace (1980), I assume that there is a
minimum investment size, K, , with K, > y,where y is per-capita income. I further
aSStune that K, is a linear function of per-capita output.5 The role for the bank,
therefore,. is to pool together small savers to acquire capital.
Households are infinitelylived withpreferences described by the follo",ing CES
utility function
u = ff3tC~-~ -1, (2.3)
'=0 1 - (J"
where c denotes the quantity of the consumption good, 0 < f3 < 1 is the
time rate of preference, and (J" > 0 is a parameter such that; is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. I assume population is constant such that there is no
aggregation bias associated with treating movements in per-capita quantities as
equivalent to movements in aggregate quantities.
The household's date-t budget constraint is
5The linearity assumption·ensures that small savers do· not grow rich enough to meet the
minimum investment size condition. Ifso, the bank would be dispensible. One way to motivate
this assumption is appeal to a legal restriction the keeps banks from making loans smaller than




where d, denotes the deposits (measured in units of the consumption good)
carried over from date t-l to date t, R is the gross real rate ofreturn on deposits,
and g is the per-capita lump-sum transfer payment given to households. In this
setup, deposits are simply the stored consumption good. As such, the same intu-
ition applies here as for models in which capital is valued as a stored consumption
good. In addition, the household faces a terminal constraint. The idea is that
the household can sell claims against future deposits, but never at a value greater




] hm T-l = 0,
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which guarantees that the period budget constraints can be combined into an "
infinite horizon, present value budget constraint. The CES momentary utility
function has the property that Uc ---'> 00, C ---'> O. Hence, an interior solution for c,
and d'+1 is guaranteed.
The bank accepts deposits, usingthe proceeds to purchase real money balances
and capital. Capital is then rented to finns at date t. Banks maximize profits in
a perfectly competitive environment and the cost of providing banking services is
zero. Every unit of capital returns A + (1-8) units of the consumption good next
period. Capital rate of return dominates money, but banks hold fiat money to
satisfy a reserve requirement",.
Finally, the government can commit to a sequence of (aggregate) lump-sum
transfers equal to G, units of the consumption good to households. The only
means of financing the expenditure is through seignorage revenue. The govern-
ment budget constraint is, therefore,
G _ M, - M'-l ,- .
p,
Taking the sequence of gross real interest rates as given, committing to se-
quence of lump-sum transfer payments is consistent with a sequence of reserve
ratios and fiat money stocks, taking a sequence of deposits as"given. To determine
the price level, it is necessary to state the money market equilibrium condition:
(2.7)
6where D is the aggregate level of bank deposit. Money carried over from date
t-1 purchases .L units of the date-t consumption good. Thus, the gross real rate p,
of return on fiat money is P'-l . I assume that capital rate of return dominates fiat
~ .
money so that A + (1 - 0) > p~~'. The policy rule guiding money is as follows:
Mt = (),Mt- 1
2.2. Equilibrium and the balanced-growth equations
An equilibrium in this model economy is a sequence of prices {Pt, qt, R,}, real
allocations{Ct, Xt, k,}, stocks offinancial assets {Mt ,dt }, and monetarypolicy vari-
ables bt, ()t} such that
(i) Given prices and monetary policy, the real allocations and stock
of financial assets solve the household's maximizationproblem (2.3)
subject to (2.4) and (2,5);
(ii) Given prices and monetary policy, the allocations solve the firm's
date-t profit maximization problem;
(iii) Given prices and monetary policy, the stock of financial assets
solve the bank's date-t profit maximization problem;
(iv) Mt_1 = 'YtDtPt-lt and Ct + kt+l - (1- o)kt = Akt,·\ft ;::: O..
In this model economy, balanced growth mean~ that output, consumption,
and deposits will grow at the same rate in the equilibrium defined above. With
capital offering a higher rate of return than fiat money, the demand for money in
equation (2.7) characterizes one part ofthe banks' asset allocation decision. Thus,
Kt = (1 - 'Yt)Dt. Thus, the return to the banks' portfolio (and to depositors) is:
R, = (1 - 'Yt)[A + (1 - 0)] +'YtP'-l.
. Pt
(2.8)
The return on deposits is the weighted average of the return to the two assets
held by banks, capital and fiat money. With PI-l < A +(1 - 0) , equation (2.8)
PI
implies that the return on deposits is inversely related to movements in the reserve
requirement ratio.
The agent's first-order condition implies that output, deposits, and consump-
tion will grow at the rate Pt. The rate along the balanced-growth path will be
1 Pt-l 1
Pt = ((3R,)U == {(3[(1- 'Yt)(A +1- 0) +'Yt-]}U
Pt
7
(2.9)Equation (2.9) implies that the economy's growth rate is inversely related to
the reserve requirement ratio and to the inflation rate.6 In this growth setting,
the reserve requirement crowds out capital accumulation in the sense that capital
accumulates at a slower rate. In the limit, with, = 0, monetary policy becomes
divorced from the economy's growth rate. As Jones and Manuelli (1995) show in
a model in which there is a cash-in-advance constraint on the consumption good,
the rate of return on capital is independent of changes in money growth. Slightly
different from Jones and Manuelli, when, = 0, there is no monetary equilibrium
in this economy. The intuition is the Keynes-Ramsey rule, a decline in the return
to the agent's portfolio relative to the time rate of preference increases current
consumption, depressing capital accumulation and reducing growth.
With , > 0, the relationship inflation and money growth is the quantity
theory. Equation (2.7) togetherwiththe balanced-growthconditionthat D~-;I = Pt
implies that (h = Pt7ft· From equation (2.9) and the balanced-growth equation in
the money market,it is trivial to show that economy's growth rate is inversely
related to money growth. The intuition is exactly the same as that employed in
the discussion of changes in the reserve requirement ratio. Faster money growth
(hereafter, higherinflation) is inversely related to the gross real return on deposits.
In.the remainder of this paper, I will focus on cases in which the reserve
requirement ratio and inflation rate are constant over time. As Robert King and
Sergio Rebelo (1990) note, the agent in this model economy has finite utility if
and only if f3p1- u < 1. This condition will hold in all the experiments considered
throughout this paper.
3. Monetary Policy Experiments
In this section, I consider the impact of changes in monetary policy on seignorage
revenue. In particular, I am interested in the following case: suppose that the
present value of government expenditures is Go for the baseline setting of the
monetary policy parameters, say ,0 and 7fo.7 Can fund the same level of govern-
ment spending, altering either the reserve requirement ratio, the inflation rate, or
"Both David Romer (1985) and Scott Freeman (1987) show how reserve requirements crowd
out the level of private capital in a stationary economy. .
7It is easier to pick the inflation rate and find the money growth rate that is consistent ·as·
defined by the moneygrowth-inflation relationship. For nonzero reserve requirementsl money
growth is a nonlinear function in the inflation rate. Thus, there are multiple inflation rates
associated wtih a particular rate of money growth.
8both?
3.1. Calibration
Obviously, to begin the experiments, it is necessary to select parameter values for
the model. For this analysis, the model economy's periodis assumedto correspond
to one year. Following King and Rebelo, the growth rate of technology (p) is 2%.
Following Jones and Manuelli, I choose IJ = 2 and 0 = 0.1. For the inflation rate
and reserve ratio, I use the average values reported in Table 1; that is, 7r = 1.21
and I = 0.17. I choose A = 0.165, and f3 = 0.958 Throughout, this analysis, I
will set the initial capital stock, Ko, equal to 1.
3.2. Computational experiments
To characterize the present value of the goveniment's budget constraint, r- note
that real government expenditures are growing at the same rate as the economy,
so that the ratio of government spending to output will remain constant. Let




Substituting the money supply rule and equation (2.7) into equation (3.1)
yields
JDt J l- (6 - 1)-= aA{f3[(l- J)(A+1-8) +-]}•.
7r 7r
(3.2)
Further substitution ofthe banks' asset allocation gives the date-t government
budget constraint as a function of reserve requirement, money growth/inflation
rate, and the capital stock; that is,
(6 -1), J '
(1 ) Kt = aA{,B[(l- J)(A+ 1 - 0) +-]};;.
-J7r 7r .
(3.3)
8An alternative method of choosing the time rate of preference is to find the gross~after·
reserve requirement return and then calculate the ratio of the gross rate of technology change
by the after-reserve requirement return. For these parameter settings, R= 1.0232, so that
f3 = 0.997. This approach, used in King and Il.ebelo, would yield a discount factor that seems
a bit high for a period as long as a year.
9(3.4)
(3.5)
From equation (3.3), it is straightforward to show that date-t real seignorage
revenue (the left-hand-side) is positively related to reserve requirement and to the
inflation rate. Next, summing over all dates, the present value of the government
budget constraint is represented as:
PVG = f(Rt t [ (& - 1)')' K, - G~].
,~O (l-ry)n
The next step is to characterize the change in the present value government
budget constraint for a given change in monetary policy.9 For example, let the
baseline reserve requirement-inflation combination be associated with the baseline
present value of government expenditures; denoted, Go. Let the baseline param-
eter settings be denoted ryO and nO. Then, let the "new" parameter settings be
denoted ryl and nl. The object is to find the present-value ofgovernment revenue
under different policy settings. Consider a case in which the reserve requirement
ratio is the only policy parameter altered. With Ko= 1, the government can fund
the same sequence of transfer payments if and only if
d(PVG) =f (n
l
- nO)Kt > 0
t~O [(1 ~ ryl)(A+1- 0) +ryll' -
h I - (6-1)-y' °- (O-I)-yO d }{ 4[(1 )(A ··1 <). 1-].1 were n = (I--y'l'" n= (I -yO)", an ,= fJ - ry + - u +" u.
From equation (3.5), one can see that changes in reserve requirements affects
the present value government budget constraint through three channels. First,
seignoragerevenue is positively relatedto changes in reserve'requirements through
the tax base effects. In short, the quantity of money agents will hold is positively
associated with movements in reserve requirements. Second, the path of capita!
accumulation is inversely related to changes in reserve requirements; that is, the
growth-rate effect. The Laffer-curve tension in the monetary policy experiments
considered here are due to whether the tax base (or tax-rate effect in the case
of a change in the inflation rate) dominates the growth-rate effect. Third, the
discount factor present in the denominator of equation (3.5) is inversely related
to the return on deposits, and thus the reserve requirement.
9Note that in these experiments, the question is posed in terms of the present value of
government expenditures. It is likely that the path for seignorage revenue will not be identical
for the two different economies being analyzed) even though the present value of government
revenues are the same. The government might need to borrow or lend to smooth the period-by-
period differences l but implicitly the present value ofgovernment debt is zero so that no wealth
effects are present.
10(3.6)




Rl - ((3Rl)~ Rl - ((3RO)~
where R1 = (1 - 'yl)(A + 1 - 5) + :;i-; and RO = (1 _,O)(A+ 1 - 5) + ~
Because monetary policy has an ambiguous effect, the next step is to apply
numerical techniques to calculate the effects on d(PVG); that is, using reasonable
parameter values, can the saine sequence of transfer payments be financed with a
lower reserve requirement?
Figure 1 presents the change in PVC given a change in the reserve ratio·from
17.3%.10 According to Figure 1, then government can afford the same level of
government spending if it raises the reserve ratio. Lowering the reserve ratio,
however, results in a shortfall in the present value of seignorage revenue. Figure
1, therefore, indicates that there is no dynamic Laff~rcurve present in the model
economy for changes in the reserve ratio. Note the curve present in d(PVG) at
reserve ratios greater than 22%. For these parameterizations, it is not possible
to determine whether d(PVG) would evenutally become negative because utility
would be infinite.
Another question is, How does the ratio of seignorage revenue to output re~
spond to changes in the reserve ratio? I calculate the date~1 levels of both
seignorage revenue and output for this model economy. With, = 0.173 and
1f = 1.214,real seignorage revenue was slightly more than 20% of output,u The
ratio seignorage revenue to output is monotonically increasing the reserve ratio
for this model economy, ranging from 0.011 when the reserve ratio is1% to 0.3096
when the reserve ratio is 25%. Thus, the model is capable of accounting for
the positive association between the seignorage revenue-to-GDP and reserve ra-
tios present in the correlation coefficient. Because the relationship between the
seignorage-to-GDP ratio is monotonically increasing in the reserve ratio, it is not
clear whether the model economy can account for the hump-shape present in the
data. Finally, note that the model economy's dependenceon seignorage revenue
is substantially larger than any we observe in the data.
lONote that I > 0.25 was not considered in this case because of the finite utility restriction.
"This large seignorage tax rate owes mostly to the assumption that capital is intermediated.
This means that the tax base is as large as possible. I relax the intermediation-only constraint
in the next section.
11The next experiment looks for the impact that changes in the inflation rate
have on seignorage revenue. Here, I consider inflation rates from 0% to 80%.
Figure 2 plots the change in PVC compared with the policy combination in which
7r = 1.21 and'Y = 0.17. Figure 2a is dominated by a huge spike in d(PVG).
Figure 2b plots the case in the maximum inflation rate is 40% What the plot
shows is that the change in PVG is small over most of the range of inflation rate
values with a pronounced spike occurring between 7r = 1.65 and 7r = 1.66. At
these two values, we see that the real return on deposits at the "new" policy
setting (R1 in equation (3.6)) is approaching(,8RO)~ from above. Consequently,
at 7r = 1.65, the denominator in the second term in (3.6) is a large positive
number, resulting in the first term in equation (3.6) nearly zero and d(PVG) is
negative. Then, at 7r = 1.66, the sign of the denominator in the second term
switches, resulting in d(PVG) becoming a large positive number. Even though
d(PVG) is negative for a higher inflation rate economy, this is notthe growth-rate
versus tax-rate opposition that is behind the Laffer curve. Figure2b focuses on
moderate inflation rates. For values of the inflation rate between 1.0 and 1.40,
there is no evidence of a dynamic Laffer curve; that is, compared with 7r = 1.214,
an increase in the inflation rate results in an increase in the present value of
seignorage revenue while for a decrease in the inflation rate results in a decline
in the present value of seignorage revenue. However, for 7r > 1.45, the amount of
seignorage revenue falls compared with what one would obtain with 7r = 1.214.
Thus, for a big enough change in the inflation rate, the model economies indicate
that the tax-rate effect will be swamped by the growth-rate effect.
For the inflation rate experiments, the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-GDP
ranges from 2.3% when the inflationrate is zero to over 96% for the case in which
the inflation rate is 80%. Thus, the model economies indicate that seignorage
revenue is quite a large proportionofoutput for the case inwhich theonecalibrates
the model using the mean values obtained in the cross-country sample. Moreover,
the model economy cannot account for the V-shaped pattern in the cross-country
relationship between the inflation rate and the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-
GDP. There is, however, some evidence that a dynamic Laffer curve operates for
cases in which the inflation rate changes.
4. A Model with unintermediated capital
I modify the economysuch that there exists a substitute for intermediated capital.
In words, the agents now have access to capital purchases that do not require an
12intermediary. The model has the feature that both intermediated and uninterme·
diated capital can be held simultaneously. This specification also matches with
Raymond Goldsmith's (1969) finding that the ratio ofthe intermediary's assets to
output will increase over time. In addition, I include an income tax to the policy
mix.
In this setup, the two types of capital are perfect substitutes in the production
process. As,such, firms will use each type ofcapitalprovidedthereare no arbitrage
opportunities, In other words, both intermediated and unintermediated capital
should offer the same gross real return. Unintermediatedcapital is not subject to a
reserve requirement, but has a diminishing marginal product. Let the technology
transforming unintermediated capital into the consumption good be described as
(4.1)
where K" denotes the stock of unintermediated capital. With popu.lation
constant, this the familiar Cobb-Douglas production technology. The arbitrage
condition maintains that agents will purchase unintermediated capital up until the
point at which its gross return is the same as the gross return on intermediated
capital. Formally,
(1 - ')')[A + (1 - 8)] +I = wB(K"r
l + 1 - 8,
7[ (4.2)
At date t=O, I assume that the two types of capital sum to one. Thus, equa-
tion (4.2) can be used to solve for K". Once we know K", then the stock of
intermediated capital is simply 1-K".
In this setup, the limiting condition is that all capital will be intermediated.
Thus, the presumption is that intermediation possesses an advantage over direct
financing after a large enough capital stock has been accumulated. This assump-
tionis partially supported by the stylized fact presented in Raymond Goldsmith's
book. Goldsmith observed thatthe ratio ofbanks' asset,to output had been rising
over the period 1869-1963. With A < 1, balanced growth implies that the ratio
of intermediated capital to output rises.
There are additional calibrationissues associatedwithmodelextension. Specif-
ically, the unintermediated capital productivity term, B, and the exponent on
unintermediated capital, w. For the computational experiments, I set B = 0.25
and w = 0.35.
Figure 3 plots d(PVG) associated with a change in the reserve ratio. The
experiment sets the "initial" policy combinations as before. The main result in
13Figure 3 is that d(PVG) increases (falls) for those cases in which the reserve
ratio is lower (higher) than 17%. With unintermediated capital included in the'
model, the growth-rate dominates the tax-base effect for changes in the reserve
ratio. Thus, with two types ofcapital in the model, the government can spend the
same amount, in present-value terms, by lowering the reserve-requirement ratio
because the additional growth more than offsets the reduction seignorage revenue
that occurs because of a reduction in the tax base. In short, there is a dynamic
, Laffer curve operating in this model economy. The intuition behind this quanti-
tative result is that there is substitution between the two types of capital. With
unintermediated capital , a reduction in the reserve ratio makes intermediated
capital relatively more attractive, which partially offsets the reduction in the tax
base that accompanies the reduction in the reserve ratio. In this'experiment,'the
elasticity of substitution between unintermediated and intermediated capital is
large enough so that the growth-rate effect can dominate the·net reduction in the
tax base.
Introducing unintermediated capital into the model also affects the relation-
ship between the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-GDP and the reserve ratio. First,
the range ofthe ratio narrows dramatically when compared with the model econ-
omy in which only intermediated capital is available. At ry =0.01, seignorage
revenue is only 0.36%% of GDP at date 1. The maximum seignorage revenue-to-
GDP ratio is 4.3% which occurs with ry = 0.19. This range of outcomes is well
within the range we observe in the cross-country data. Second, there is ahumpc
shape exhibited in the relationship between seignorage revenue and the reserve
ratio. Figure 4 shows this pattern in the model economy's data. Thus, there
is date-specific Laffer curve operating on the seignorage revenue in response,to
movements in the reserve ratio. Here, an increase in the reserve ratio means that
households substitute unintermediated capital for intermediated capital. Hence,
the tax base can either rise or fall, depending on whether the stock of intermedi-
ated capital falls more or less than the reserve requirement ratio. Figure 4 shows
that for this model economy, the decline in intermediated capital more than offset
the increase in the reserve requirement ratio for reserve ratios above 19%.
Next, I run the inflation-rate experiments in the economy with two types of
capital. Figure S plots the change in the present value ofgovernment revenues for
different values of the inflation rate. Figure Sa plots the entire range of inflation
rates consideredwhile Figure5b plots theoutcomes for valuesof1T between 1.0 and
1.4. Figure Sa is dominated bythe spike that arises as R1 approaches (fJRO)'!; from
above. As one can see, d(PVG) is positive for case in which 1T is below its initial
14value of 1.214 and becomes negative for values above this initial setting. This
evidence indicates that thereis a dynamic Laffer curve. As 1r falls, the growth-rate
effect on d(PVG) is opposite to the impact corresponding to the lower tax rate.
The results for this model economy indicate that the growth-rate effect dominates
the tax-rate effect for 1r E [1.0,1.45J. For higher inflation rates, the reduction in
the tax rate app.ears to be larger than the growth rate gains in that d(PVG) is
positive. As in the reserve-requirement experiments, an increase inthe inflation
rate results in households substituting for unintermediated capital and away from
intermediated capital. In the case of higher inflation rates, real seignorage revenue
is positively affected by the higher tax rate, but negatively affected by a reduction
in the real reserves held by banks. On balance, the growth-rate is given greater
weight when compared against the net change in date-t real seignorage revenue.
Finally, the question is whether the model with two types of capital can ac-
count for the V-shaped pattern present in the s - 1r relationship. Interestingly,
the ,atio of seignorage revenue-to-GDP is negative in this model economy for
very low inflation. rates. For example, with zero inflation, () < 1, so that date-t
seignorage revenue is negative. So, instead of seignorage revenue, the economy
exhibits a seignorage subsidy at low inflation rates. Figure 6 plots the ratio of
seignorage revenue-to-output for the range of inflation rates considered. There is
pronounced hump-shaped pattern in s as the 1r increases, attaining a maximum
of 0.0438 when 1r = 1.25.
Thus, the model economy with two types of capital is successful on two fronts,
failing on a third. First, and not surprisingly, a model with unintermediated
capital produces ratios of seignorage revenue-to-output that are closer to what
we observe in the actual data across countries. Second, the model economy can
account for the hump-shaped pattern in the relationship between the seignorage
revenue-to-output ratio and the reserve ratio. The failure is that model cannot
account for the V-shaped pattern in the relationship between seignorage revenue-
to-output and the inflation rate.
One can break the ratio of real seignorage revenue-to-output down to better
understand why s is positively related to inflation at low inflation rates. At low
inflation rates, real seignorage revenue, the numerator in the ratio is positively
related to inflation while the denominator, output, is negatively related to in-
flation. With low inflation rates, an increase 1r causes households at date-t to
substitute unintermediated capital for intermediated capital, which in turn leads
to a reduction in real money balances in the modeleconomy. The tax rate increase
more than offsets decline in the tax base, accounting for the rise in real seignorage
15revenue. Output declines as both types of capital become less productive. In the
model economy, s reaches a maximum because real seignorage revenue begins to
decline faster than output. Evidently, at high enough inflation rates the move-
ment in the tax base becomes so small that higher tax rates no longer can offset
the reduction in real money balances.
Suppose that the two monetary policy parameters move together. Table 5
reports the results in which the inflation rate is regressedon thereserve ratio, using
the cross country data. The data show that every one-percentage-point increase
in the reserve requirement is associated with a L2-percentage-point increase in
the inflation rate. I run a set of experiments using the model economy with two
types of capital, using the regression results to guide a coorclination scheme. The
results, plotted in Figure 7, show that the hump-shaped pattern prevails. this
is not too surprising since the reserve requirement and inflation rate together
have reinforcing effects on seignorage revenue and on output. The hump appears
after the policy actions crowd out enough intermediated capital so that seignorage
revenue responds to higher reserve requirements by falling at a faster rate than
output.
5. Summary and conclusions
The purpose ofthis paper is to examine the relationships between seignorage rev-
enue and two monetary policy parameters-reserve requirements and the inflation
rate. I begin by reviewing some the evidence examined in Fischer's (1982) paper
on seignorage revenue across countries. The data answer a basic question, What
has happened since Fischer investigated this seignorage across countries. On the
empirical side, the contribution of this paper is to look for correlations between
seignorage revenue relative to GDP and the monetary policy variables. Interest-
ingly, the cross-country evidence shows that seignorage revenue as a proportion
of GDP exhibits a hump-shaped pattern with respect to reserve ratios; that is,
starting from low reserve ratios, one sees that the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-
GDP is positively correlated with reserve requirements. At some level, however,
the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio reaches a maximum and falls as the reserve
ratio rises further. With the respect to the inflation rate, the data indicate that
the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio exhibits a V-shaped pattern
I specify a simple endogenous growth model to determine whether one can ac-
count for this stylized fact and to ask whether there is a Laffer curve for monetary
policy actions. Including the reserve requirement means that the government can
16experiment with tax rates, the tax base, or both. In my experiment, the govern-
ment can finance a stream ofexpenditures (read, lump-sum transfers) with known
present value for a given monetary policy course. The computational experiment
is to determine whether the government can finance the same present value of
expenditures, changing either reserve requirements, the inflation rate, or both. I
run this computational experiment for a member of the Ak-class of economies in
which all capital is intermediated and also for a model economy in which there
are two types of capital-intermediated and unintermediated. The tension arises
in these models because while one can raise seignorage revenue directly by raising
either the inflation rate or reserve requirement, both courses ofaction will depress
growth.
The results of the experiments can generalized as follows. In the Ak model,
there is no dynamic Laffer present. Moreover, the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-
GDP in these model economies are both monotonkally increasing in the mone-
tary policy variables, thus failing to account for the stylized facts found in the
cross-country data. Besides the growth-rate effects being swamped by the tax
rate/base-effects in the model economies, the economies produce ratios ofseignor-
age revenue-to-GDP that are roughly five times the maximum ratios found in the
data.
There is some success in the models with two types of capital. These model
economies obviously relax the assumptions that all capital is intermediated. With
this feature, it is possible to match the seig;.lorage revenue-to-GDP ratios as one
introduces inter-capital substitution into the model. In this setup, a dynamic
Laffer curve is present, the growth-rate effect dominates the tax rate/base ef-
fects. An increase in the monetary policy variables have the same growth-rate
effects as in the Ak model. Here, however, an increase in either policy variable
results in a substitution from intermediated capital to unintermediated capital,
partially offsetting the positive effects that an increase in the inflation rate or
reserve requirement has on seignorage revenue. In addition, the ratio of seignor-
age revenue-to-GDP exhibits the hump-shaped pattern in response to movements
in reserve requirements. Unfortunately, the same pattern is present in the re-
lationship between the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio and the inflation rate.
At high-enough values for the policy variables, enough intermediated capital is
crowded out so that seignorage revenue falls more than output falls, resulting in
a decline in the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio. Can one account for different
response patterns between the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio and the two mon-
etary policy variables by coordinatingmonetary policy actions? The answer is no;
17the cross-country data indicate that the policy variables are positively correlated
with one another.
Though the model economies fails in attemptingto account for the relationship
between the seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio and inflation, the results do point
to some features that a model would have, thus providing a useful guide for future
research. The seignorage revenue-to-GDP ratio will fall as long as growth falls at
a slower rate than seignorage revenue. Hence, future research would aim for an
approach in which the growth-rate effects are a bit smaller. The model economies
studied in this paper possess growth-rate effects that are a bit too large compared
with what we observe in actual cross-country data. In addition, it would seem
useful to raise the sensitivity of the tax base to movements in the inflation rate
in the model economies, such that real seignorage revenue decreases when the
inflation rate rises even at moderate inflations. In these model economies, the
interaction between the inflation and the reserve requirement means that real
seignorage revenue is going to be about as sensitive to both monetary policy
variables. The inability of model economies to account for the V-shaped pattern
in the ratio of seignorage revenue-to-GDP and inflation rate data is not amenable
to a quick fix. Preliminary experimentation with these model economies shows
that seignorage revenue-to-GDP tends to have the same pattern response to a
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adj R2 = 0.23
22Table 5
Monetary Policy Coordination Tests
1ri = 1.007+ 1.196"(i
Stnd. Errors: intercept = 0.108, "(i = 0.485
S.E.E. = 0.623, adj R2 = 0.06 .
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Country Avg. Growth Avg. Avg. Res Avg. Change in
Name Per Capita Inflation Ratio Base Money I
Output Nominal GDP
Algeria 8.736 11.547 26.097 0.873
Australia 1.662 8.156 6.145 0.245
Austria 2.557 4.734 6.155 0.428
Bahrain 4.239 6.116 23.710 1.653
Bangladesh 1.324 13.048 71.193 1.437
Barbados 5.806 8.316 13.753 1.083
Belgium 2.364 5.507 2.1683 0.211
Burundi 1.563 9.207 11.789 0.421
Cameroon 1.808 8.740 5.027 0.300
Canada 1.944 6.361 4.318 0.184
Chile 1.873 84.800 32.544 2.406
Congo 0.841 6.914 4.920 0.337
Costa Rica 1.959 18.672 30.691 1.421
Cote d'Ivoire -0.201 7.876 7.421 0.298
Cyprus 4.549 70.029 67.465 0.684
Denmark 1.796 7.097 3.406 0.290
Domin. Rep. 2.043 17.996 37.092 0.731
Ecuador 2.587 27.301 31.677 0.763
EI Salvador 0.339 9.046 1I.702 0.578
Ethiopia -1.375 8.545 26.045 1.234
Finland 2.179 8.008 4.923 0.333
France 2.051 7.237 3.403 0.165
Gabon 8.364 7.285 5.330 0.125
Gambia 1.603 12.823 21.064 0.568
Germany 1.666 3.840 9.486 0.520
Ghana -0.422 40.056 42.606 0.442
Greece 2.378 16.171 19.717 0.877
Grenada -0.446 12.780 28.276 3.677
Guatemala 0.557 12.728 24.383 0.540
Guyana 0.D78 20.879 21.118 1.913
Honduras 1.353 37.997 30.855 0.216
Iceland 3.635 29.897 23.488 0.148
India 4.637 12.434 20.928 0.420
Indonesia 6.992 11.050 12.626 0.655
Ireland 3.465 9.667 10.992 0.473
Israel 0.905 8.811 23.953 3.204
Italy 2.659 10.859 15.638 0.748
Jamaica 2.953 8.664 9.566 1.283
Japan 2.682 5.232 2.318 0.538
Jordan 2.387 15.287 32.141 2.241
Kenya 0.832 14.055 10.823 0.858
1Korea 4.339 4.451 8.312 1.217
Lesotho 1.657 14.095 20.307 0.831
Madagascar -2.155 12.897 11.168 0.441
Malaysia 8.264 6.589 56.480 4.913
Maldives 0.883 9.791 14.331 0.980
Malta 6.516 4.278 27.128 4.267
Mexico 2.304 17.139 45.287 0.789
Morocco 1.806 7.478 5.378 0.997
Myanmar 2.254 10.581 17.190 0.586
Nepal 5.902 9.583 11.550 1.296
Netherlands 1.773 4.611 0.648 0.417
New Zealand 1.132 10.177 4.656 . 0.087
Niger 0.440 5.204 21.205 0.585
Nigeria 0.986 21.231 14.796 0.628
Norway 2.918 7.471 1.834 0.256
Pakistan 0.968 14.425 . 13.101 0.672
Papau New Guinea 0.768 7.202 13.214 0.217
Paraguay 1.601 62.727 31.639 1.880
Phillipines 6.758 4.372 8.363 1.341
Portugal 3.517 16.177 13.800 1.325
Rwanda -2.834 9.053 15.314 0.278
Senegal -0.571 6.868 11.855 0.556
Seychelles 5.984 8.791 7.800 0.861
Sierra Leone -0.224 43.375 38.757 0.671
Singapore 5.240 6.561 5.261 0:652
South Africa -0.300 12.330 5.254 0.221
Spain 2.322 11.230 11.211 0.722
Sri Lanka 2.117 8.648 11.410 1.064
St.Lucia 5.115 6.738 15.138 1.230
St.Vincent 0.559 11.080 17.064 0.295
Sudan -1.228 38.474 33.912 0.830
Sweden 1.326 7.993 2.629 0.489
Switzerland 1.164 4.213 8.889 0.323
Syria 2.403 13.674 12.160 0.597
Thailand 4.260 11.145 2.777 1.970
Trinidad & Tobago -0.210 6.341 7.634 0.703
United Kingdom 1.826 9.220 4.696 0.175
United States 1.441 5.921 4.858 0.271
Uruguay 0.066 18.360 19.182 0.562
Venezuala 1.429 9.337 8.661 0.417
Zambia -2.096 45.542 22.043 0.485
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